We investigate the costs of transportation regulation using the example of agricultural markets in the United States. Using a large database of prices by state of agricultural commodities, we find that dispersion fell for many commodities until the First World War. We demonstrate that this reflected changes in transportation costs which in turn in the long run depended on productivity growth in railroads. 1920 marked a change in this relationship, however, and between the First and Second World Wars we find considerable disintegration of agricultural markets, ultimately as a consequence of the 1920 Transportation Act. We argue that this benefited railroad companies in the 1920s and workers in the 1930s, and we put forward an estimate of the welfare losses for the consumers of railroad services (i.e. agricultural producers and final consumers).
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I
Nominal rigidities can have a substantial impact on the economy, as macroeconomists have long been aware. There is for example a substantial literature about wage stickiness and other rigidities as a cause of the Great Depression 2 . This paper deals with the rigidity in the price of transportation brought on by the policy of the ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission), the regulatory body for railroads, following the guidelines of the Transportation Act of 1920. We also provide tentative calculations suggesting that, by causing real transportation costs to increase with the deflation of the interwar years, the resultant market disintegration led to losses corresponding to a not insubstantial share of American GDP. This claim is not entirely new: economists raised the issue in the 1930s and O'Brien 3 has investigated the effect of this regulation on industrial employment.
The present paper complements his work by considering agricultural goods, arguably more sensitive to transportation costs than manufactures, and improves it by analyzing more carefully the relationships between transportation costs, rail productivity and regulation.
The paper speaks also to the still expanding literature on market integration , has argued that the 'antebellum transportation revolution' caused widespread convergence in prices before the Civil War. The trend continued after 1870 8 and there is also evidence of a parallel increase in efficiency in the market for wheat 9 and for perishables after the introduction of mechanical refrigeration in railroads 10 3 period after 1910. By neglecting this period, we claim, scholars have missed a very interesting story, which this paper aims at presenting. Prices for agricultural products did converge in the long-run from the Civil War to the late 1960s, but the process slowed down to the point of stagnation in the 1920s and reversed at the beginning of the Great Depression. We interpret this latter as a consequence of regulation.
The next section traces the long-run price convergence and shows the extent of the reversal, while section 3 relates these changes to the variations in (real) costs of transportation by rail and also by water. Section 4 shows that the real costs of rail transportation followed productivity growth before the First World War, and that that relationship broke down after 1920. Section 5 sketches out the history of regulatory policies, focusing on the 1920 Transportation Act, which changed the very principle of regulation of railroads. Section 6 deals with the welfare effects: the policy benefited railroad companies in the 1920s and workers in the 1930s at the expense of farmers and consumers. Section 7 concludes.
II
Market integration is a twofold process, featuring both an increase in the speed of return to equilibrium price gaps after a shock and a decline in these gaps -i.e. σ-convergence
11
. The return to equilibrium is the outcome of arbitrage by profit-seeking traders and thus the increase of speed reflects growing market efficiency à la Fama 12 -most notably a better circulation of information about prices and fundamentals. In an efficient market, equilibrium price differentials must be equal to the transaction costs for trade. These two conditions ought to be tested separately, with different techniques. Testing efficiency needs time-series cointegration methods with highfrequency data 13 , while in levels it can be measured by pairwise trends in relative prices or, for a large number of markets, by trends in the coefficient of variation. In this paper, we focus on this latter concept for two reasons. First, levels of prices are more important than the adjustment to equilibrium, as they determine decisions by consumers and producers. Second, high-frequency price data are available only for a few locations and commodities. In contrast, prices of agricultural 11 Federico, 'Market integration'. 12 Fama, 'Efficient capital'. 13 See Brunt and Cannon, 'Integration', for a discussion on the dangers of using infrequent data for these types of analyses.
4 commodities on an annual basis are quite abundant: the ATICS dataset, collected and described in detail by Cooley et al 14 , which was kindly made available to us by Stephen J. DeCanio, provides them for all states between 1866 at the earliest and 1970 at the latest.
The data refer to farm gate prices and thus they measure directly the effect of price convergence on the welfare of farmers, which affected heavily politics in agricultural communities. Farm gate prices are bound to differ from (city) market prices by the transportation costs to cities and they might be noisier than comparable market prices, to the extent that farmers had less information than city traders. . The three columns on the left of Table 1 report the averages of the coefficient of variation for these products at the beginning and the end of the period and in the worst years of the Great Depression. As expected, prices converged in the long-run, but the 14 Cooley et al, ATICS. 15 Jacks, 'International commodity'. 16 In 1929, the eight products accounted for 73% of the total gross output of crops, and the omitted ones for 6% (Strauss and Bean, Gross farm income).
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process is much less impressive than one would expect. . Last but not least, milk cattle were a production good, with huge qualitative differences, which increased price dispersion and made arbitrage difficult.
The three columns on the right report results of a formal test of price convergence. Following
Razzaque et al
19
, we run the regression:
If ≠ 0 and −1 < < 0, the coefficient of variation lnCV has a non-zero deterministic trend, to which it reverts after any short-term shock (e.g. a war, the opening of a new railroad). In this specification, the long-run trend rate can be computed as = − ⁄ ). A negative value implies long-run convergence. The coefficient measures the speed of return to this long-run path, while the lagged shock term is added to address possible serial correlation.
[ Table 1 about here]
All the ECM terms are negative and significant, and they imply half-lives of shocks ranging from a minimum of six months for potatoes to a maximum of five years and one month for milk cattle.
Prices converged in seven cases out of eleven (eight if rye is included), albeit at different rates. Not surprisingly, convergence was faster for goods consumed nationwide than for those traded mostly 6 locally, such as potatoes. The latter products were also more sensitive to local weather conditions 20 .
Finding convergence in prices in the railroad era is not really a surprise. What is surprising is the time pattern of the process, as exemplified in Figure 1 by the case of wheat
21
. Prices converged fairly steadily until 1920 and after 1940, but dispersion remained roughly constant in the 1920s and 1930s, with a very high peak in the early 1930s. Convergence was extremely fast during the Second World War and the early 1950s, when dispersion attained its lowest level for the whole century.
[ Figure 1 about here] One might argue that wheat was not representative since its fast convergence process (Table 1) magnified a small fluctuation in dispersion as a major reversal. Wheat was indeed an extreme case from this point of view (Table 2 ), but dispersion was substantially above trend throughout the whole interwar period for about half the products and it was exceptionally high in the early 1930s for all products except cotton, hogs and sheep. Furthermore, the majority of significant break points are concentrated in the early 1920s and in the 1930s. There is therefore something to explain.
[ Market prices were also affected by the activities of the Commodity Credit Corporation (or CCC), which was established in November 1933. It lent money to farmers upon the promise of crops, which were valued at a pre-determined loan rate. A rational farmer would forfeit the crops if the market price fell below the loan rate, and this thus acted as a minimum price, equal across the whole country. If the loan rate exceeded the (unobservable) price which would have prevailed without the CCC, the lending facilities of the CCC fostered integration. This seems to have been the case for corn and above all for cotton. In fact, the loan rate was quite close to the observed market prices (on average in the decade 85% for corn and about 90-95% for cotton) and loans 22 Benedict, Farm policies. 23 The Act listed specifically wheat, cotton, corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk, and amendments in 1934-35 added cattle, rye, flax, barley and potatoes. Thus, the Act covered all the products we consider except sheep and oats. For wheat, producers received a subsidy equivalent of a fixed proportion of past production, provided they agreed to cut their acreage by 15%. The AAA opened the possibility of marketing agreements between the Department of Agriculture and associations of producers or processing firms to control the interstate commerce of commodities not covered by the basic program. Few such agreements were stipulated and none of them concerned the commodities we are interested in. 24 Davis, Wheat, pp. 147, 361 , and pp. 364 the processing tax on milling to pay for the program increased price of bread.
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were substantial especially for cotton 25 . In contrast, loans from the CCC to wheat producers remained negligible until 1939.
Summing up, the New Deal farm policies fostered the integration of the corn and cotton markets after 1934, but they only affected the wheat market very marginally before the late 1930s.
However, our source is likely to understate the actual dispersion of wheat prices in 1934-1935. and it would thus be imprudent to interpret our results after 1934 solely as a consequence of changes in transportation costs. In contrast, we are convinced that transportation costs must have been the main cause of integration (or lack thereof) until 1933.
Transportation costs are usually measured by the ratio of unit costs to the price at origin -or freight factor
26
. We proxy unit costs with a series of average railroad revenues per ton/mile, and,
given our interest in agricultural markets, we divide it by an index of agricultural prices
27
. Figure 3 compares this freight factor with the coefficient of variation for wheat.
[ Figure 3 about here]
From visual inspection, the trends appear fairly similar, and this first impression is confirmed by statistical testing (Table 3 ). The first column reports the p-values of the Johansen test for (no) cointegration, while the two others give the coefficients of real revenues per ton-mile (RATES) in the OLS regression
[ Table 3 about here]
Given the regulation of rail transportation (Section 5), one can safely assume rates to have been exogenous. The long-run elasticity for wheat (0.74) implies that a 1% increase in transportation costs by rail increased the coefficient of variation of wheat prices by about 0.1 points at the mean. 
9
The elasticity for the period 1867-1933 is somewhat lower (0.47), but the difference is not statistically significant.
The results for other commodities by and large confirm the causal relation between costs of transport by rail and the integration of the market. However, the elasticities differ widely for all the products and, even when the relationship holds in the long run, there are noticeable divergences in the medium and short run, such as in the 1950s and 1960s for wheat ( Figure 3 ).
These differences might reflect, at least in part, two shortcomings of revenues per ton/mile as a measure of overall transport costs.
First, even if rates for each product on every route remain constant, revenues can change because of changes in the distribution of total rail traffic. It is possible to control, at least partially, for this composition effect by using the data on revenues and quantity shipped by product from the official freight statistics (ICC ad annum [ Figure 4 about here]
10
The figure documents the beginning of the trucking revolution in transportation, which however is unlikely to have contributed much to interstate integration (or lack thereof) for the agricultural products we are covering, with the possible exception of livestock. In fact, trucking was particularly competitive for 'the short-haul, perishable, and relatively high priced commodities, the majority of which had previously been shipped by rail at less-than-carload or express rates'
31
. In 1938 trucks ferried 40% of shipments of fruits, vegetable and butter and over 50% of shipments of livestock into (a sample of) main markets. The use of road transport for long-range shipment of bulky commodities was hampered by the technical shortcomings of the early trucks and, above all, by the dearth of suitable roads, before the construction of the interstate highway system in the 1950s.
Before World War Two, the real competitor to rail for long-range commerce was still water transport. Indeed, rail companies recognized this fact by setting higher rates to customers without access to water transport
32
. The share of water transport increased from 32% in 1922 to 45% in 1939 and this must have reduced the total cost of transportation. If, for instance, water transport cost a third less than rail transport (a reasonable conjecture), the rise of its share would cut total costs by almost 4%. The lack of data also prevents us from estimating the extent of substitution for agricultural goods (and the subset we are focusing on). However, one can quote two pieces of indirect evidence, which seem to imply that substitution affected less agricultural products than other goods. First, the marketed share of agricultural production, and thus the demand for transportation services, which had been growing since the beginning of the 20 th century, declined by a few percentage points during the Great Depression
33
. Second, the shipments of agricultural products by rail decreased less than total shipments both throughout the whole interwar period and during the Great Depression
34
. Summing up, real revenues per ton/mile seem to be a fairly accurate measure of the cost of rail transportation and possibly also of aggregate costs, at least in 31 Barger, 'Transportation', pp. 206. 32 Sharfman, Interstate. 33 The share of 'cash marketing receipts' in the sum of this latter and 'farm goods consumed on farm' (Carter et al, Historical Statistics, Da1288 and Da1290) It is possible to show that the share shipped by rail was inversely related to the relative costs of transportation costs by regressing it on the ratio of rail to water costs. These latter can be measured by all-water freights for the period 1875-1920 and by mixed rail-water freights for 1875-1933. In both cases, the coefficients are significant at 1% and the elasticities, respectively -0.6 and -0. [ Figure 5 about here]
On the other hand, a visual inspection shows a clear coincidence of trends, and indeed the two series are cointegrated at 1%. A regression with the market price gap (as in Figure 5 ) as dependent variable and the all-rail nominal rate as the measure of transportation cost yields an elasticity of 1.04 (significant at 1%) for the period 1867-1939 39 . Using the Illinois-New York gap in farmgate prices increases the elasticity for the same period to 1.34, still significant at 1%, while for the whole period 1867-1967 the elasticity is much lower (0.28) and not significant. This result might reflect the distortions from the fixed-rate loans of the CCC. Indeed, adding a dummy for the period 1939-1967 the elasticity rises to 0.96 (significant at 1%), while the dummy itself is negative and significant at 1%. These results are robust to the addition of the share of rail shipments on total grain shipments, as a measure of the competition between rail and water and/or of a time trend as more generic measure of changes in market organization and efficiency.
To sum up, the available evidence, from both nationwide and route-specific data, confirms that changes in railroad rates caused similar, although not identical, movements in price differentials and thus in the level of integration. York from the ATICS data-base at 1% and the coefficient of correlation between the two is 0.87. 39 In this case we use the nominal rate because the dependent variable is the absolute price gap.
IV
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collusive agreements or by regulation, part of the productivity gains could be transformed into rents, to be appropriated by sector-specific factors (capital or labour). Productivity gains were indeed huge: from the 1870s to the early 1950s, the total factor productivity of railroads increased nine times 40 . Railroads easily outperformed the rest of the economy, as in the same years the total factor productivity of the American economy increased by 'only' 3.5.
In the long run, as expected, productivity growth caused the real rail revenues per ton mile to [ Figure 6 about here]
In the 1920s, total factor productivity increased by about 15%, while real revenues increased by 40%. On the other hand, the increase in rates in the early years of the Great Depression did coincide with a sharp, but short-lived fall in productivity (an 18% decline from 1929 to 1932 (Carter et al, Historical Statistics, Cc. 84) , rather than with prices of agricultural products only, as we are considering the whole transportation. Anyway, the results of a deflation with farm prices are qualitatively very similar. 42 The coefficient is significant at 1% (t-stat 4.10) and residuals are stationary. 43 The null hypothesis of a break in trends of Total Factor Productivity in 1914 or 1920 cannot be rejected even at 10%. 44 Re-running the regression with Illinois freight factor (computed with the farm-gate prices), the estimated elasticities are higher (-1.54 over the whole period, -1.69 and -1.10 in 1889-1919 and 1920-1953) , but they still differ significantly between the two periods.
45 A more comprehensive model should also take into account trends in productivity in other sectors (if not already accounted for in a perfect price index) and any difference in the rate of growth in demand across sectors. The necessary data for building such a model, however, are not easily found, and the task would steer us too far away from the main issue of the present paper.
14 almost all their productivity gains to their clients, while they retained most of the gains in the next two decades.
V
The federal government started to regulate interstate rail transportation in February 1887, after the failure of state-level regulation 46 . It met the request by farmers, who had been accusing railroad companies of colluding in order to extract monopoly profit since the 1860s
47
. The
Interstate Commerce Act forbade companies to share traffic (pooling), but allowed them to set common rates, provided that rates did not discriminate between customers (notably between short and long-range hauls) and were 'reasonable and just', with no further specification.
Monitoring was entrusted to a new agency, the ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission). Three years later, the pro-competitive orientation of legislation was confirmed by the approval of the Hepburn Act authorized the ICC to impose a maximum rate, at its discretion and upon shippers' complaints, without waiting for a court order. The Mann-Elkins Act subjected all changes in rates to a preventive authorization from the ICC. Thus, on the eve of World War One, the ICC could prevent companies from raising rates if it deemed the increase unjustified, but it could not prevent them from cutting rates, provided that the cuts did not discriminate between their clients. legislation, the Transportation Act (February 1920), introduced by Esch-Cummings. It dealt with many issues, from the capitalization of companies to labour relations, but the key provisions from our point of view are those related to regulation. They were clearly meant to reduce competition in order to make investment in railroads attractive again. In fact, the Act allowed pooling among companies, subjected the building of new lines (a major source of competition) to preventive authorization by the ICC and gave the agency a broad and vaguely defined power to re-organize the rail networks and to exempt if necessary the companies from the anti-trust legislation. Above all, the Act gave the ICC the task of setting minimum rates and, unlike previous laws, specified a clear guiding principle for its decisions. The ICC had to guarantee a 'fair return', around 5.5%, to the total capital invested in railways, although not to each company. Five years later, Congress tried to soften this rigid principle, by approving the Hoch-Smith resolution which asked the ICC to take into account, while setting the fares, also the needs of distressed productive sectors (a codeword for agriculture). A resolution was not as binding as an Act, and thus the action of the ICC was Whatever the situation on that route, anyway, competition was likely to be higher than on routes not subject to competition from water transport and on local traffic. According to the Transportation Act, the federal guarantee to railroad companies (i.e. the subsidies) was to disappear in September 1920. The ICC prepared this movement by approving massive increases in rates (i.e. 33.5% for interstate traffic). The motivation for this decision was impeccable, but the timing was unfortunate. In fact, prices had started to fall in summer 1920 and the combined effect of the fall and the rise in rates caused a sudden upward jump in the real cost 12 years it changed rates only six times and by very small steps. In May 1946, both specific rates and nominal revenues were still 10% lower than in 1929, while agricultural prices were 20% higher and Chicago wheat prices 60% higher. Given the 'umbrella rate' policy, one could surmise that all transportation costs remained low during the war, and, together with the effect of the loan policy 66 Cf. for a similar effect in Poland in the same years Wolf, 'Border effects', pp. 427.
19
by the CCC (Section 3), this can explain the integration. After 1946, the ICC started to increase rates, and the freight factor returned to its long-term trend levels 69 .
To sum up, changes in the regulatory framework and in policy decisions by the ICC can explain the movements in nominal and real costs of transportation, especially during the Great Depression and the two world wars. These changes tally well with trends in integration.
VI
The evidence so far points to a clear-cut hypothesis about winners and losers from railroad regulation. Until 1920, the ICC at the very least did not restrict competition and probably fostered it as much it could, given its powers. Therefore, 'consumers of rail services benefited at the expense of owners of railroad inputs'
70
. Under the 1920 Transportation Act, railroad companies earned rents at the expense of consumers and the whole American economy paid a price in terms of foregone trade and income. How big were these gains and losses?
As a starting point, Figure 7 reports two indexes of profitability of railways companies, the ratio of net returns to stock market capitalization and to gross revenues [ Figure 7 about here]
Here we will focus on the ratio to market capitalization, as this latter is the best available proxy for the value of companies, to which the ICC had to guarantee a fair return
72
. Profits were quite low in the 1890s but they rose in the 1900s to about 3-3.5%. During the war, profits increased further, thanks to subsidies, to fall in the late 1910s slightly below their pre-war levels. Thus, a 5.5% 'fair' return was quite high in historical perspective, although consistent with the returns to safe 69 Healy, US railroads. 70 Fishlow, 'Internal transportation', pp. 598. 71 The data of capital (Carter et al, Historical Statistics, Df982) are net of shares of other companies. The net returns are computed by deducting expenditures, including payment of interests from total revenues (ibid, Df998). 72 Actually, the accuracy of market capitalization as a measure of the capital invested in railways was very controversial. Companies allegedly over issued stock and thus reduced the return. The Congress approved a Valuation Act (1913) in order to have an independent assessment of the capital of the companies. After fifteen years of work, the committee arrived to a figure very close to the market capitalization (Martin, Enterprise, pp.358) . How much did producers and consumers lose? Federico 75 puts forward a simple formula to estimate deadweight losses as a variant of the well-known Harberger triangles which allows a positive wedge (i.e. transaction costs) to remain. Given a exogenous price change Δ , losses for a producing (or consuming) area can be computed as
where and are the price elasticities (in absolute terms) and the parameters and are the shares of production and consumption of GDP in each area for the relevant goods. Thus, > in a producing area (e.g. 'Chicago') and vice-versa in a consuming one ('New York'). The difference | − | is a simple index of specialization, ranging from 0 (all areas are self-sufficient for all goods)
to 1 (all areas are fully specialized in one product).
73 Carter et al, Historical Statistics, series Cj1192. 74 Average compensation computed as total wages/number of employees (ibid, Df1003 and Df1002) . Deflated with BLS consumer price index (ibid, series Cc1). Output per worker from Kendrick, Productivity trends, tab G-III. 75 Federico, Grain invasion.
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In the case at hand, Δ is the difference between the actual change in transportation costs and the counterfactual costs had the Transportation Act not been approved. We obtain an index of these costs by extrapolating the 1920 real revenues over the whole period to 1940 according to the growth in TFP given the coefficient from the revenue-TFP ratio equation (Section 4) for the period 1889-1919. Then we convert this index into an estimate of the freight factor by assuming that the nationwide freight factor was 10% in 1920
76
. If it had changed as much as productivity, it would have fallen to 7% in 1939 rather than increasing to 18%. The difference between this counterfactual freight factor and the actual one is a crude measure of losses from regulation (or Δ ). Since we have no information on elasticities, we will simply assume that the price elasticity of demand ranged from -0.5 to -1 and the price elasticity of supply from 0.5 to 1.5.
77
In theory, one should estimate the total losses according to equation 2 for all trading areas for each product. This task needs some evidence on the shares of production and consumption of GDP and on how the change in the price wedge is distributed between (each pair of) producing and consuming areas. These data are not available and collecting them is plainly beyond the reach of this paper. Just to give a hint of the possible outcomes, we provide here a highly simplified back-of-the envelope estimate, considering a 'composite' good transported from a producing area (P) to a consuming one (C). The losses are thus respectively
The total losses for the country are the sum
It is possible to simplify further the expression by assuming that the total increase in the price wedge (10%) was evenly distributed between the two areas -so that ∆ = ∆ = ∆ = 0.05%
76 In that year the Chicago and Illinois freight factors were respectively 7% and 10.5%, and the Missouri one (the ratio of transportation costs from St. Louis to New York to the farm gate prices) 13%. 77 Cf. for a comprehensive list of (old) estimates of agricultural supply Askari and Cummings, Agricultural supply.
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and that demand and supply elasticities were equal ( = = and = = ). Thus the expression becomes
To get an upper bound of losses we hypothesize that all tradable goods were transported by rail and that all areas were fully specialized -i.e. that nothing was consumed in the producing area ( = 0) and nothing was produced in the consuming area ( = 0). In this extreme case, we assume the differences | − | to be 30%, which is the share of tradable goods, defined as the sum of agriculture, mining and manufacturing, in American GDP
78
. As a lower bound we assume that the difference | − | was only 5% (e.g. as a result of = 17.5% and = 12.5% in producing areas). These parameters yield four estimates, with a range between 0.55% of GDP (minimal specialization, low elasticities) and 3.10% (full specialization, high elasticities). These estimates are very robust to changes in elasticity parameters. In fact, they determine only the extent of change in trade (second term in equation 2), which accounts for only a small part of total welfare losses. Most of these latter (the first term in equation 2) accrued to railroad companies in terms of higher gains on the remaining transportation.
These estimates are very crude, but they at least give some idea as to the magnitude of the losses due to the disintegration of markets between the wars. 
VII
This paper has demonstrated that important insights can be gained through an investigation of domestic market integration, even for the twentieth century. In the United States, the well known decline of price dispersion for agricultural goods from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century was interrupted by a period of considerable market disintegration during the interwar period.
We demonstrate that changes in price dispersion were caused by changes in the cost of transportation by rail, only partially offset by substitution to cheaper means of transportation.
Until the First World War, the cost of transportation closely followed changes in railroad productivity, but the 1920s mark a major discontinuity, at which point railroads were able to retain a larger part of the productivity gains instead of passing them to their consumers. This break is associated with the 1920 Transportation Act, from which point changes in the regulatory framework and in policy decisions by the ICC explain the movements in the cost of transportation, and thus by implication market integration. Finally, we demonstrate that losses from the resultant disintegration made up a substantial share of GDP at a very delicate moment. From 1933, however, the situation changed for institutional decisions -the Agricultural Adjustment Act had a small effect, but more importantly the change in remit of the ICC caused it to revise its policies.
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